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Abstract
This paper investigates data transmission and physical layer secrecy in cognitive radio network. We propose
to apply full duplex transmission and dual antenna selection at secondary destination node. With the full duplex
transmission, the secondary destination node can simultaneously apply the receiving and jamming antenna selection
to improve the secondary data transmission and primary secrecy performance respectively. This describes an
attractive scheme in practice: unlike that in most existing approaches, the secrecy performance improvement in
the CR network is no longer at the price of the data transmission loss. The outage probabilities for both the
data transmission and physical layer secrecy are analyzed. Numerical simulations are also included to verify the
performance of the proposed scheme.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) improves spectrum utilization by sharing resources between primary and cognitive
radio (secondary) users. Among various spectrum sharing schemes including underlay, overlay and
interweave, the underlay scheme is often of interest in practical implementation [1]. In the underlay
approach, the secondary user is allowed to access the spectrum of the primary user if its interference to
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2the primary user is below a certain level. It is known that the antenna selection provides an attractive
approach in the underlay CR network [2]–[4]. In the CR antenna selection schemes, the ‘best’ antenna
with the least interference to the primary users and strongest link for the secondary data transmission is
often selected among a number of available antennas equipped at the secondary users.
An important issue that has attracted much attention recently is the physical layer network security in
the CR system. Unlike the traditional cryptographic security system [5], the physical network security is
based on Shannon theory using channel coding to achieve secure transmission [6]–[11]. The physical layer
security has been investigated in various systems including direct point-to-point transmission (e.g. [12]),
distributed beamforming in cooperative networks (e.g. [13], [14]), cooperative jamming (e.g. [15]–[17]),
relay and jammer selection (e.g. [18]–[20]) and buffer aided relay network [21].
The physical layer secrecy is of particularly interest in the CR network. This is because that the
primary users are designed to share the spectrum with secondary users, making it also ‘convenient’
for eavesdroppers to intercept the informative data. In [22], the secondary source is used as a jammer
to improve the secrecy performance of the primary network. This is not a typical CR network as the
secondary user does not transmit its own data. In [23], a CR network with multiple secondary users is
considered, where the secondary user which maximizes the secrecy performance of the secondary network
is selected for data transmission. In [24], transmission powers are carefully allocated between the primary
and secondary users to balance the primary and secondary secrecy rates. Similarly in [25], powers are
optimally allocated to maximize the secrecy rate in a MIMO cognitive network, which is achieved with
distributed beamforming at the source or the relay. All of these approaches mainly focus on the physical
layer secrecy in the CR network. This motives us to investigate approaches which can improve the physical
layer secrecy and data transmission at the same time.
In this paper, we propose a dual antenna selection to improve data transmission in the secondary network
and secrecy performance in the primary network simultaneously. This is achieved by equipping full duplex
multiple antennas at the secondary destination. Full duplex transmission, which was previously considered
difficult to implement due to the associated self interference, is now an attractive alternative in many
applications because of the recent advances in the fields of antenna technology and signal processing
[26]–[28]. In this paper, the receiving antenna selection at the secondary destination node is used to
maximize the data transmission capacity in the secondary network. On the other hand, because of the full
duplex transmission, the transmission antenna selection is also used at the secondary destination to transmit
3jamming signals to the eavesdropper so that the secrecy capacity of the primary network is improved. With
the full-duplex dual antenna selection at the secondary destination, unlike existing approaches, the secrecy
and data transmission performance no longer have to compromise for each other but can be improved
simultaneously. This describes a new way in applying full-duplex (beside its capability in increasing data
rate), which is of particular interest in 5G applications including CR network, D2D transmission and small
cell systems.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
 Proposing the full duplex dual antenna selection scheme to improve the data transmission for the
secondary network and secrecy performance for the primary network simultaneously. Both cases with
and without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains are considered. As far as the authors are
aware, this is the first attempt to simultaneously improve the secrecy and data transmission in the
CR network.
 Deriving the closed-form expressions the outage probability for the secondary data transmission. The
analysis shows that the receiving antenna selection provides diversity gain in the secondary data
transmission.
 Deriving the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability for the primary network. The
analysis shows that, even without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains, the jamming antenna
selection can still improve the secrecy performance of the primary network.
 Analyzing the secrecy diversity order and coding gain for the primary network, and concluding that the
secrecy performance improvement from the jamming antenna selection comes from the coding gain
rather than the diversity gain. This is very different from the traditional antenna selection schemes for
data transmission, where the performance gain is mainly from the diversity gain. The results provide
very useful insight in designing practical secrecy systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the dual antenna selection
schemes; Section III analyzes the outage probability for the secondary data transmission; Section IV
derives the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability for the primary network; Section
V analyzes the secrecy diversity order and coding gain for the primary network; Section VI verifies the
proposed antenna selection scheme with numerical simulations; finally Section VII summarizes the paper.
4II. DUAL ANTENNA SELECTION AT THE SECONDARY DESTINATION
The system model of the secure cognitive network is shown in Fig. 1, which consists of the primary
network (including one primary source node PS and one primary destination PD), the secondary
network (including one secondary source node SS and one secondary destination node SD), and one
eavesdropper E. The secondary destination SD performs in the full duplex mode, and is equipped with
multiple antennas, where there are K1 antennas for receiving data from the secondary source and K2
antennas for transmitting jamming signals to the eavesdropper. All other nodes are equipped with a
single antenna and perform in the half duplex mode.
Fig. 1. Dual antenna selection in the secure CR network.
We denote SDi and SDj as the ith and jth receiving and jamming antennas at node SD, where
i = 1;    ; K1 and j = 1;    ; K2, respectively. As is illustrated in Fig. 1, the channel coefficients for
SS ! SDi, SS ! E, SS ! PD, SDj ! PD, SDj ! E, PS ! SDi, PS ! PD, PS ! E and
SDj ! SDi are denoted as hsdi , hse, hsp, hdjp, hdje, hpdi , hpp, hpe and hdjdi , respectively.
The channel gains are denoted as ab = jhabj2 correspondingly, which are independently exponentially
distributed with mean of ab = E[jhabj]2, where ab 2 fsdi; se; sp; djp; dje; pdi; pp; pe; djdig. We assume
that sdi = sd, pdi = pd, djp = dp and dje = de, for all i = 1;    ; K1 and j = 1;    ; K2.
Without losing generality, we assume the transmission power at PS and noise variances are all
normalized to unity, and the channels are quasi-static so that the channel coefficients remain unchanged
5during one packet duration but independently vary from one packet time to another. We also assume
the secondary users have knowledge of the channel-state-information (CSI) between the secondary and
primary users. This can be achieved by feeding back CSI from the primary user to the secondary transmitter
directly or indirectly by, for example, a band manager between the two parties [29], or sensing pilot signals
from primary users [30].
A. Receiving antenna selection
The receiving antenna is selected with the best data transmission performance in the secondary network.
Because the secondary destination SD operates in full-duplex mode, it receives data from the secondary
source SS and transmit jamming signals to the eavesdropper E at the same time. If the jth jamming
antenna SDj is selected, the received signal at the ith receiving antenna SDi is given by
ysdi =
p
Psshsdiss + hpdisp +
p
Psdhdjdist + nsdi ; (1)
where ss, sp and st are the transmission signals from nodes SS, PS and the SDj respectively, Pss and
Psd are the transmission powers at SS and SD respectively. It is clear that third term at the right hand
side of (1) is the residual self-interference from the SDj to SDi.
Then the capacity for data receiving at SDi is given by
Csd;i = log2

1 +
Psssdi
pdi + Psddidi + 1

: (2)
Considering that current technology can significantly suppress the self interference to the noise level
(e.g [31], [32]), we assume that residual self-interference term Psddidi has little effect on Csd;i. Further
assuming the channel SNR is high enough, we approximately have
Csd;i  log2

1 +
Psssdi
pdi

: (3)
In the underlay CR system, the interfering power from the secondary network to the primary destination
must be below a certain level. Similar to those in [23], [33], the transmission powers of SS and SD can
be constrained as Psssp  Ith and Psddjp  Ith respectively. Then replacing Pss in (3) with Ith=sp
gives
Csd;i  log2

1 +
Ith
sp
 sdi
pdi

: (4)
6Thus we propose that the receiving antenna at the secondary destination SD is selected maximizing
(4) such that
ir = arg max
i=1; ;K1

sdi
pdi

: (5)
B. Jamming antenna selection
The jamming antenna is selected with the best secrecy performance in the primary network. Below
we first derive the secrecy capacity for the primary network, from which the jamming selection rules are
proposed.
1) Data transmission capacity at PD: Because the secondary destination SD performs in the full
duplex mode, the secondary source SS transmits data and SD transmits jamming signals at the same
time. Thus both SS and SD impose interference to the primary destination PD. If the jth antenna SDj
is selected, the received signal at PD is given by
ypd;j = hppsp +
p
Psshspss +
p
Psdhdjpst + npd; (6)
where npd is the noise at node PD. Then the capacity for data transmission at PD is obtained as
Cd;j = log2

1 +
pp
Psssp + Psddip + 1

: (7)
Using the CR power constraints in (7), we have
Cd = log2

1 +
pp
2Ith + 1

 log2

pp
2Ith + 1

; (8)
where the approximation holds at high SNR, and the jamming antenna index j is ignored because (8)
holds for every SDj . We note that it is common to assume high SNR in the physical layer secrecy systems
to focus on the secrecy performance (e.g. [18], [21]).
2) Eavesdropping capacity at E: Due to the full-duplex transmission at SD, the eavesdropper receives
signals from PS, SS and SD simultaneously. If jth jamming antenna SDj is selected, the received signal
at the eavesdropper E is given by
ye;j = hpesp +
p
Psshsess +
p
Psdhdjest + ne; (9)
where ne is the noise at the eavesdropper E.
While the jamming signal st imposes interference on the eavesdropper E, the transmission from PS
7and SS forms an multiple-access channel at E. But unlike the typical multiple-access channel, for the
secrecy performance of the primary network, the eavesdropper intends to ‘intercept’ the data from the
primary source PS (and not that from the secondary source SS). Therefore, the eavesdropping capacity
for the primary data sp detection is a piece-wise function of the SS ! E channel gain se as is shown
in the following. We suppose the data rate of the secondary source SS is Rdata.
 If log2(1 +
Pssse
Psddje+1
) < Rdata, the SS ! E channel is too weak for the eavesdropper to decode the
secondary data ss, so that ss can only be treated as interference. Then the eavesdropping capacity
for the primary network is obtained as
Ce;j = log2

1 +
pe
Pssse + Psddje + 1

; if Pssse < (2
Rdata   1)(Psddje + 1): (10)
 If log2(1+
Pssse
pe+Psddje+1
) < Rdata < log2(1+
Pssse
Psddje+1
), the eavesdropper can jointly decode the data
from PS and SS. Considering that SS transmits at rate Rdata, the eavesdropping capacity for the
primary network is obtained as
Ce;j = log2

1 +
pe + Pssse
Psddje + 1

 Rdata;
if (2Rdata   1)(Psddje + 1) < Pssse < (2Rdata   1)(pe + Psddje + 1):
(11)
where the first term at the right-hand-of (11) is the ‘overall’ capacity for the sp and ss detection.
 If log2(1 +
Pssse
pe+Psddje+1
) > Rdata, the SS ! E channel is strong enough for the eavesdropper to
decode ss first (by treating sp as interference). The eavesdropper then subtracts the ss term from its
received signal (which is given by (9)), and decodes sp. Then the eavesdropping capacity for the
primary network is obtained as if there is no SS transmission as
Ce;j = log2

1 +
pe
Psddje + 1

; if Pssse > (2
Rdata   1)(pe + Psddje + 1): (12)
3) Secrecy capacity: If the j jamming antenna SDj is selected, the secrecy capacity ( [8]) in the
primary network is obtained as
Cs;j = [Cd   Ce;j]+; (13)
where [a]+ = max(a; 0).
It is clear from (13) that, in order to have large secrecy capacity, the jamming antenna at the secondary
destination need to be selected corresponding to large data transmission capacity Cd at PD and small
8eavesdropping capacity Ce;j at E. Or the selected antenna has high ‘jamming’ to E and low ‘interference’
to PD. This again requires large jhdjej2 and small jhdjpj2, as is shown in (7) and (10-12), respectively.
Thus we propose to select the jamming antenna with the largest ratio of dje=djp. In fact, as will be
shown later in (25) and (26), this jamming antenna selection scheme maximizes the upper and lower
bounds of the secrecy capacity.
4) Jamming antenna selection rules: We assume that the secondary destination SD is aware of the
SDj ! PD channel gains djp. Then depending on the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming channel
gains, we propose two jamming antenna selection rules:
Case 1 - If the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming channel gains is available, the jamming antenna
is selected to satisfy
jcase 1 = arg max
j=1; ;K2

dje
djp

: (14)
Case 2 - If the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming channel gains is not available (which is often the
case in practice), the jamming antenna is selected to satisfy
jcase 2 = arg max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp

: (15)
Below, we drive the outage probabilities for the data transmission in the secondary network and secrecy
performance in the primary network.
III. OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE SECONDARY DATA TRANSMISSION
This section analyzes the outage probability of the data transmission in the secondary network. If the
ith receiving antenna SDi is selected at the secondary destination, the data transmission capacity in the
secondary network is given by (4) when the channel SNR is high enough. Because the receiving antenna
is selected from K1 antennas, and from (5), the capacity for the data transmission is approximately given
by
Csd  log2
0B@1 + Ith  maxi=1; ;K1

sdi
pdi

sp
1CA : (16)
The outage probability for data transmission in the secondary network is then given by
Pd;out = P (Csd < Rdata); (17)
9where Rdata is the data rate at the secondary source SS.
Substituting (16) into (17) and letting X1 = max
i=1; ;K1

sdi
pdi

, Y1 = sp, Z1 = X1=Y1 and z1 = 2
Rdata 1
Ith
,
we have
Pd;out = FZ1(z1) = P (X1=Y1 < z1)
=
Z 1
0
FX1(z1y1)fY1(y1)dy1;
(18)
where F (:) is the cumulative density function (CDF).
The CDF of X1 and probability density function (PDF) of Y1 can be obtained as
FX1(x1) =

x1
N + x1
K1
and fY1(y1) =
1
sp
e
  y1
sp ; (19)
respectively, where N = sd=pd.
Finally, substituting (19) into (18) gives
Pd;out =
8><>:
1  N
spz1
e
N
spz1 Ei(1; N
spz1
); if K1 = 1;
spz1
N
K1 1 MG[[0];[ ]];[[K1 1;K1];[ ]]; Nspz1 
 (K1)
; if K1  2;
(20)
where Ei(1; a) =
R1
1
exp( ta)
a
dt; a > 0,  () is the gamma function, and MG ([[ ]; [ ]]; [[; ]; [ ]]; ) is the
Meijer G function [34].
It is clear from (20) that the outage probability Ps;out well depends on N , or a larger N leads to
smaller outage probability. It is thus of interest to show the diversity order for the data transmission in
the secondary network which is defined as
dd =   lim
N!1
log10 Pd;out
log10N
: (21)
We note that the definition in (21) is similar to that of the conventional diversity order except now the
SNR is replaced with the parameter N . The diversity order defined in (21) reflects the decreasing rate of
Ps;out with respect to the receiving antenna number K1.
Unfortunately, because (20) contains the Meijer G functionMG(:), it is very hard to derive the diversity
order. On the other hand, numerical results show that MG(:) has little effect on the diversity order. Then
ignoring the MG(:) term in (20), we approximately have
dd    lim
N!1
log10(spz1=N)
K1 1
log10N
= K1   1; K1  2: (22)
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This shows that the receiving antenna selection introduces diversity gain in the data transmission, which is
similar to that in the traditional antenna selection schemes [4]. This result will be verified in the simulation
later.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE PRIMARY NETWORK
This section analyzes the secrecy outage probability of the primary networks. Both Case 1 and 2,
with and without the knowledge of the jamming channel gains respectively, are considered. Because the
eavesdropping capacity is a complicated piece-wise function as is shown in (10-12), it is hard (if not
impossible) to obtain the closed form expression of secrecy outage probability for the primary network.
Instead, the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy outage probability are derived.
First, the maximum eavesdropping capacity for the primary source Ce;j is obtained when the signals
from SS has no effect on the eavesdropper to detect the data from PS. This happens when se = 0, or
Pssse > (2
Rdata   1)(pe + Psddje + 1) so that the SS ! E link is strong enough for the eavesdropper
to successfully decode ss and subtract it from the received signal. Thus when jth jamming antenna is
selected, the upper bound of the eavesdropping capacity is given by
C
(up)
e;j = log2

1 +
pe
Psddje + 1

: (23)
On the other hand, we notice that when log(1+ Pssse
Psddje+1
) < Rdata, or Pssse < (2Rdata 1)(Psddje+1),
the eavesdropper cannot decode ss so that the signals from SS is treated as interference. When Pssse >
(2Rdata 1)(Psddje+1), ss and sp (from SS and PS respectively) can be jointly decoded. Therefore, the
minimum eavesdropping capacity Ce;j is reached when Pssse = (2Rdata   1)(Psddje + 1). Substituting
Pssse = (2
Rdata   1)(Psddje + 1) into (10) then gives the lower bound of Ce;j as
C
(low)
e;j = log2

1 +
pe
  (Psddje + 1)

; (24)
where  = 2Rdata   1.
Recall that the capacity for data transmission at the primary destination PD is given by (8). Then
substituting (8), (23) and (24) into (13), and with the CR power constraints, we obtain the lower and
upper bounds of the secrecy capacity for the primary network (corresponding to the jth jamming antenna)
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as
C
(low)
s;j =
h
Cd   C(up)e;j
i+

h
log2

Ithppdje
(2Ith+1)pedjp
i+
; (25)
C
(up)
s;j =
h
Cd   C(low)e;j
i+

h
log2

Ithppdje
(2Ith+1)pedjp
i+
; (26)
respectively, where the approximation holds at the high SNR which is often of interests in secrecy
performance [18]. In the following two subsections, we drive the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy
outage probability for Case 1 and 2 respectively.
A. Case 1 - with the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming channel
The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 1 is shown in (14).
1) Upper bound - Case 1: Noting that the jamming antenna is selected among K2 antennas, and from
(25), the lower bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 1 is obtained as
C(low; case 1)s =

log2

Ithpp
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1 ;K2

dje
djp
+
: (27)
Then the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 1 is given by
P
(up; case 1)
s; out = P (C
(low; case 1)
s < Rsecrecy); (28)
where Rsecrecy is the target secrecy rate.
We let X = max
j=1 ;K2

dje
djp

, Y = pe
pp
and Z = X=Y . Further noting that the CDF of the division of
two random variables is given by (18), the CDF of X and PDF of Y can be obtained as
FX(x) =

x
M + x
K2
and fY (y) =
L
(L+ y)2
; (29)
respectively, where M = de=dp and L = pe=pp.
The CDF of Z is then given by
FZ(z) =
Z 1
0
FX(zy)fY (y)dy: (30)
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Substituting (29) into (30) gives
FZ(z) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Lz[Lz M M ln( zLM )]
(Lz M)2 ; if K2 = 1;
Lz[ L2z2+M2 2LMzln( zLM )]
(Lz M)3 ; if K2 = 2;
Lz[2L3z3+3L2Mz2 6LM2z+M3 2L2Mz2ln( zLM )]
2(Lz M)4 ; if K2 = 3;
Lz[12L5z5+65Mz4L4 120z3L3M2+60z2L2M3 20zLM4+3M5 60L4Mz4ln( zLM )]
12(Lz M)6 ; if K2 = 5;
   ;
(31)
We note that there is no uniform format of FZ(z) with respect to the number of jamming antennas K2.
But the closed form expression can be obtained for any given K2, some of which are shown in (31).
Finally from (28), the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability of primary network is given by
P
(up; case 1)
s; out = FZ(u); (32)
where u = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith
.
2) Lower bound - Case 1: On the other hand, from (14) and (26), the upper bound of the secrecy
capacity in Case 1 is obtained as
C(up; case 1)s =

log2

  Ithpp
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1 ;K2

dje
djp
+
: (33)
Then the lower bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 1 is given by
P
(low; case 1)
s; out = P (C
(up; case 1)
s < Rsecrecy): (34)
Following the same procedures as those in obtaining (32), we have
P
(low; case 1)
s; out = FZ(v); (35)
where v = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith , and FZ(:) is given by (32).
B. Case 2 - without the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming channel
The jamming antenna selection rule in Case 2 is given by (15).
1) Upper bound - Case 2: From (15) and (25), the lower bound of the secrecy capacity is obtained as
C(low; case 2)s =

log2

Ithppdje
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp
+
: (36)
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The upper bound of the secrecy outage probability in Case 2 is then given by
P
(up; case 2)
s; out = P (C
(low; case 2)
s < Rsecrecy): (37)
We let X2 = max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp

, Y2 =
pp
pe
and W1 = dje. Using the order statistics, the CDF of X2 is
obtained as
FX2(x2) = e
  K2
dpx2 : (38)
The PDF-s of W1 and Y2 are given by
fY2(y2) =
1=L
(1=L+ y2)2
and fW1(w1) =
1
de
e
  w1
de : (39)
respectively.
Further letting T1 = X2W1, the CDF of T1 is given by
FT1(t1) =
Z 1
0
FX2(t1=w1)fW1(w1)dw1 =
dpt1
deK2 + dpt1
: (40)
Finally we let Q = T1Y2, and obtain the CDF of Q as
FQ(q) =
Z 1
0
FT1(q=y2)fY2(y2)dy2
=
Ldpq
h
dpqL K2de  K2deln

dpqL
K2de
i
(K2de   dpqL)2 :
(41)
Comparing (37) and (41), we then have
P
(up; case 2)
s; out = FQ(u) =
Lu
h
 MK2 + uL MK2ln

uL
MK2
i
(MK2   uL)2 ; (42)
where u = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith
, M and L are defined in (29).
2) Lower bound - Case 2: From (26) and (15), the upper bound of the secrecy capacity in Case 2 is
obtained as
C(up; case 2)s =

log2

  Ithppdje
(2Ith + 1)pe
 max
j=1; ;K2

1
djp
+
: (43)
Then following the similar procedures as those in obtaining (42), we obtain the lower bound of the
secrecy outage probability in Case 2 as
P
(low; case 2)
s; out = P (C
(up; case 2)
s < Rsecrecy) = FQ(v); (44)
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where v = 2
Rsecrecy (2Ith+1)
Ith .
V. ASYMPTOTICAL SECRECY PERFORMANCE
It is shown above that, in both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy performance of the primary network depends on
the ratio of M = de
dp
, or a larger M results in better secrecy performance. In fact, M to the secrecy outage
probability is similar as the SNR to the data transmission outage probability. Thus it is of great interest to
analyze the asymptotical secrecy performance that is, when M !1, how the secrecy performance varies
with the number of jamming antenna K2. Similar to the conventional data transmission, the asymptotical
secrecy performance includes the secrecy diversity order and coding gain.
When M !1, the secondary source SS transmission has little effect on the eavesdropping capacity
so that the secrecy outage probability is close to the upper bound. Thus the secrecy diversity order and
coding gain can be defined based on the upper bound of the secrecy outage probability. To be specific,
the secrecy diversity order is defined as
ds =   lim
M!1
log10 P
(up)
s;out
log10M
: (45)
Similar to the classic diversity order, the secrecy diversity order reflects the decreasing rate of the secrecy
outage probability with respect to the antenna number K2.
On the other hand, the secrecy coding gain can be defined as
cs = lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up)
s;out(K = Kb)  lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up)
s;out(K = K2); (46)
where P (up)s;out(K) is the secrecy outage probability if there are K antenna available for jamming antennas
selection, K2 is the number of available jamming antennas, Kb is the number of jamming antennas in the
baseline system for comparison. As will be shown below, we let Kb = 2 and Kb = 1 in Case 1 and Case
2 respectively. It is clear from (46) that the secrecy coding gain reflects the ‘shift’ of the secrecy outage
probability with respect to the antenna number K2.
A. Case 1 - with the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming channel
From (31), and ignoring lower orders of M terms, we have
lim
M!1
P
(up; case 1)
s; out =
8<: Lz  ln(M)M 1; if K2 = 1;Lz
K2 1 M 1; if K2  2:
(47)
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Substituting (47) into (45) gives the secrecy diversity order in Case 1. To be specific, if K2 = 1, the
secrecy diversity order is obtained as
d (case 1)s (K2 = 1) =   lim
M!1
log10(Lz  ln(M)M 1)
log10M
=   lim
M!1
log10(Lz)
log10M
  lim
M!1
log10(ln(M))
log10M
  lim
M!1
log10(M
 1)
log10M
= 1:
(48)
And if K2  2, the secrecy diversity order is given by
d (case 1)s (K2  2) =   lim
M!1
log10(
Lz
K2 1 M 1)
log10M
= 1 (49)
Combining (48) and (49), we obtain the secrecy diversity order in Case 1 as
d (case 1)s = 1: (50)
On the other hand, as is shown in (47), limM!1 P
(up; case 1)
s; out has a uniform expression for K2  2.
Thus we let Kb = 2 in (46) as a baseline to define the secrecy coding gain in Case 1 as
c(case 1)s = lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up; case 1)
s; out (K = 2)  lim
M!1
10 log10 P
(up; case 1)
s; out (K = K2): (51)
Substituting (47) into (51) gives the secrecy coding gain in Case 1 as
c(case 1)s = 10 log10(K2   1); for K2  2: (52)
B. Case 2 - without the knowledge of the SDj ! E jamming channel
From (42), and ignoring lower orders of M terms, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability for Case
2 is given by
lim
M!1
P
(up; case 2)
s; out =
Lz
K2
 ln(M)M 1: (53)
Substituting (53) into (45) gives the secrecy diversity order in Case 2 as
d (case 2)s =   lim
M!1
log10(Lz=K2  ln(M)M 1)
log10M
= 1: (54)
On the other hand, because (53) holds for any K2, we let Kb = 1 in (46) as a baseline to define the
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secrecy coding gain in Case 2 as
c(case 2)s = lim
M!1
10 logP
(up; case 2)
s; out (K = 1)  lim
M!1
10 logP
(up; case 2)
s; out (K = K2): (55)
Substituting (53) into (55) gives secrecy coding gain in Case 2 as
c(case 2)s = 10 log10(K2): (56)
C. Discussion
It is clear from (50) and (54) that, in both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy diversity order is 1. Or the
decreasing rate of the secrecy outage probability with respect to M is always 1, no matter how many
transmission jamming antennas are used at the secondary destination.
On the other hand, it is shown in (52) and (56) that, with more transmission jamming antenna for
selection at the secondary destination, the secrecy outage performance still improves due to the coding
gain. It is interesting to note that (52) and (56) are consistent, because they are defined based on Kb = 2
and Kb = 1 as the baselines respectively.
Therefore, in both Case 1 and 2, the jamming antenna selection at the secondary destination leads to
the secrecy coding gain, but not the diversity gain. This contrasts sharply with the traditional antenna
selection approaches for data transmission, where the diversity order usually goes up with the antenna
number. The analysis also shows that, even without the knowledge of the SD ! E jamming channel
gains, the secrecy performance still improves with the jamming antenna selection.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we provide theoretical and simulation results to verify the proposed dual antenna selection
scheme in the CR network. In the simulation, the CR network consists of one pair of primary source PS
and destination PD, and one pair of secondary source SS and destination SD. Except for SD, all nodes
are equipped with a single antenna. While there are multiple antennas at SD, the antenna numbers are
respectively set for different simulations. All channels are Rayleigh flat fading and channel coefficients
remains unchanged during one time slot but vary independently from one time slot to another. The
average channel gains for different channel groups, PS ! SDi, SS ! SDi, SDi ! E and SDj ! PD
respectively, can be different but the channels within each of the above groups are i.i.d. For example, the
average channel gains for PS ! SD1;    ; PS ! SDM are the same, but the average channel gains for
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PS ! SD1 and SS ! SD1 may be different. This describes a typical CR network, and the different
average channel gains for each group represent different path-loss for every node at various locations
within the network. All simulation results are obtained by averaging over 1,000,000 independent runs.
Other parameters including the data transmission rate and target secrecy rate are set individually for every
simulation.
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Fig. 2. The secrecy outage probabilities vs target secrecy rate with K2 = 5.
Fig. 2 (a) and (b) show the secrecy outage probability of the primary network vs target secrecy rate in
Case 1 and 2 respectively, where we set the number of jamming antenna as K2 = 5, the average channel
gains as pp = 55 dB, sp = pd = 20 dB, se = 10 dB, pe = 40 dB, de = 30 dB, dp = 20 dB and
dd = 1 dB, the interference constraint level at the primary destination as Ith = 3 and the data transmission
rate at the secondary source SS as Rdata = 2 bps/Hz. Both the simulation results and theoretical upper
and lower bounds are shown. It is clear that, in both cases, the simulation results lie between the lower
and upper bounds, which well verifies the secrecy outage analysis for the primary network in Section
IV. Specifically, when the average SS ! E channel is small (se = 5 dB) or large (se = 70 dB), the
simulation results are close to the upper bounds. This is because that, at the eavesdropper, the signals
from SS can be ignored when se is small, or successfully decoded and subtracted from the received
signal when se is large. For other SS ! E channel gains, the simulation results lie between the upper
and lower bounds. Comparing Fig. 2 (a) and (b) also reveals that Case 1 has better secrecy performance
than Case 2. This is as expected because Case 1 has the knowledge of the SD ! E jamming channel
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and Case 2 does not.
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Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probabilities for two cases vs M = de=dp (dB).
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probabilities vs M = de=dp, where we set Ith = 1, the secrecy target
rate as Rst = 4 bps/Hz and the average gain ratio L = pe=pp =  5 dB. Fig. 3 verifies the following
analsyis.
 In both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy performance of the primary network improves with more jamming
antennas.
 In both Case 1 and 2, the secrecy diversity orders for all jamming antenna numbers K2 are always
1, as are given by (50) and (54) respectively. For example, for K2 = 5 in Case 1, when M increases
from 40 to 50 dB, the secrecy outage probability approximately drops from -37 to -47dB.
 In Case 1, the secrecy coding gain is 10 log10(K2 1), as is given by (52). For example, for M = 50
dB, the secrecy outage difference between K2 = 2 and K2 = 5 is about 6 dB, which well matches
the theoretical coding gain for K2 = 5 as 10 log2(5   1)  6 dB. Note that in Case 1, the baseline
system for coding gain definition is based on K2 = 2.
 In Case 2, the secrecy coding gain is 10 log10(K2), as is given by (56). For example, for M = 50 dB,
the secrecy outage difference between K2 = 5 and K2 = 1 is about 7 dB, which well matches the
theoretical coding gain for K2 = 5 as 10 log10(5)  7 dB. Note that in Case 1, the baseline system
for coding gain definition is based on K2 = 1.
Thus Fig. 3 clearly shows that, in both Case 1 and 2, the jamming antenna selection at the secondary
destination leads to coding gain rather than the diversity gain in the secrecy outage probability.
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Fig. 4. The outage probability vs N = sd=pd of the data transmission in the secondary network.
Fig. 4 shows the outage probability for data transmission in the secondary network vs N = sd=pd,
where we set the target data rate in the secondary network as Rt = 4 bps/Hz, sp = pd = 20 dB, the
power constraint level as Ith = 1 or 3. Both the simulation and theoretical results are presented, which are
shown perfectly match. It is clearly shown in Fig. 4 that, for both Ith = 1 and 3, the outage probability
decreases with more receiving antennas and the improvement is clearly from the diversity gain. This
well verifies the analysis in Section III that the antenna selection leads to the diversity gain for the data
transmission in the secondary network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed the dual antenna selection scheme in the secure CR network. This was achieved
by applying full duplex transmission at the secondary user. The outage probability for both the data
transmission in the secondary network and secrecy performance in the primary network were analyzed,
where the analysis showed that the antenna selection leads to diversity gain for the secondary data
transmission and coding gain for the primary secrecy performance respectively. Numerical simulation
results were also shown to well verify the analysis in this paper. Both the analysis and simulations
showed that the proposed scheme describes an attractive scheme in the secure CR network.
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